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Abstract 
 
This paper endeavours to contribute to the growing institutionalist literature on the 
conception of the institution.  We draw from John Davis’ (2003) analysis of the individual in 
posing the questions: what differentiates institutions, and how can changing institutions be 
identified through time and space?  Our analysis develops Searle’s (2005) argument that 
language is the fundamental institution.  Searle’s argument is rather functionalist, however, 
and does not convey the ambiguity of language. Moreover, language and understanding, 
surely when related to most institutions in real life, delineate and circumscribe a community. 
A community cannot function without a common language, as Searle argued, but language 
also constitutes a community’s boundaries, and excludes unsavoury outsiders or alien topics 
for discussion.  This is how institutions both constrain and enable. By drawing upon 
Luhmann’s (1995) systems analysis and notions of discourse, communication, and text we 
aim to augment the existing analytical role ascribed to habit in institutional analysis. Thus, 
we submit, understanding institutional change and thus durability may progress. 
 
                                                 
1  We acknowledge the financial assistance from the University of Aberdeen’s College of Arts and Social 
Sciences. 
 2
I.  Introduction 
 
Earlier we argued that the relations and boundaries between what may conceptually be 
understood as economy and society could be organized in three ways:  Market and society as 
separate, market as embedded in society, or markets as impure since they necessarily have 
societal elements internal to them (Dolfsma et al. 2005).  In this paper we provide an 
elaboration and development of our some of our arguments by analysing that which separates 
or distinguishes and so connects institutions2, and how institutions’ durability can be 
conceptualised, when institutional reproduction infers change: what is it that retains 
institutional recognition through time and space?  These are essentially the same questions 
John Davis (2003) recently posed of the conception of the individual in economics.  We draw 
on Davis’ analysis to set these analytical questions, and in doing so aim to contribute to John 
Searle’s (2005) discussion of the architecture of institutions through the fundamental 
institution of language.  In doing so we refer to discourse, communication and narrative and 
draw upon Luhmann’s (1995) systems approach to amplify our contribution.  
Discourse analysis is one way of understanding how differences are preserved 
between spheres and also how heterogeneity within spheres may continue.  Discourse 
analysis envisages individuals being actors by drawing upon combinations of rules and 
norms, especially language itself.  As such individual actors are also social actors, such that 
action may be understood recursively as communication.  Finally, discourse is action-
communication which is shaped by individuals’ combinations of overlapping sets of rules 
and norms, and so may usefully be described as experimental.  Intending actor-
communicators will have access to sets of norms, rules and intentions which differ subtly.  
Successful action-communication is in no way guaranteed. 
Our analysis implies theoretical development.  We acknowledge that the 
institutionalist literature, and that of communities of practice, offers valuable insights and 
techniques for empirical analysis.  We adopt an organicist ontology drawn from social 
networks and from social systems theory in analysing institutions and institutional change 
through boundaries and language.3  Whilst our paper concentrates on institutions and systems 
                                                 
2  We would loosely define a boundary as an institution or set of institutions that separates two or more 
relatively homogenous entities.  Chick and Dow (2005) note that imperfect connections entail system 
boundaries.  Further, it is well established that boundaries are a means of connection as well as a means of 
distinction, such that boundaries are buffers and bridges (Thompson 1967). 
 
3 One way in which systems differ from networks is that systems explicitly address how a set of relations or 
connections can be retained or reselected over time.  While with networks, every node can be connected to 
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we emphatically reject notions of reification (and voluntarism).  We recognise that 
institutions and systems have temporal priority over individuals, but we do not accord them 
ontological priority. 
 We develop our argument across the paper’s remaining five sections.  In Section 2, 
we briefly review the nature of the institution, and draw on Searle in highlighting language as 
the fundamental institution.  This insight informs our later discussion of action and 
communication.  In Section 3, we focus further on how institutions, as norms and rules, can 
attain durability especially in an ex ante sense and for agents as actors and so perpetuating 
differences, but how durability is often, ex post, different across rules and norms.  In Section 
4, we express our argument formally as to how an element, such as cognitive procedures or 
social norms, may achieve continuity in a reflexive sense.  In Section 5, we address 
boundaries by examining discourses and by examining individuals’ actions as 
communications.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  A Resumé of the ‘Institution’ 
 
Interest in the concept of institutions has been reignited over the last three decades by the 
significant growth in references to institutions in mainstream economics, primarily through 
the lenses of ‘new institutional’ economics (Williamson 2000).  There are crucial differences 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional economics, differences that may not be reconcilable 
(Rutherford, 1989).  New Institutional conceptions of institutions tend to emphasize 
‘institutions as constraints’ to individual free will.  For example, Williamson (2000) 
addresses the capacity of governance structures to constrain individuals’ opportunistic 
proclivities, and game theoretic discussions often include ‘tit-for-tat’ norms or rules as 
strategies acting as constraints to potentially deviating individuals. 
According to ‘old’ institutionalists, ‘new’ institutionalist explanations of the existence 
of institutions are partial as they fail to recognise the enabling and facilitating roles of 
institutions.  Institutions and agents demonstrate reciprocity properties in that institutions are 
partly constitutive of individuals and are partly constituted by individuals. Hodgson (2004: 
424) describes institutions as: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
every other node.  With social systems, patterns of connections can be reproduced over time, with boundaries 
providing a simple means of connection with other entities that are necessarily in that system’s environment. 
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“… durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social  
interactions. In short institutions are social rule systems”. 
 
Crucial to our argument is the possibility that distinct but connected rules and norms have 
different scopes and durabilities4.  In addition, O’Hara (2000: 37) writes: 
 
“… institutions are the durable fabric which structures relations between classes and  
agents.  They provide the social nexus of communication which provides shared  
symbols, sites of practice, and some degree of certainty which reduces the social cost  
of human intercourse”. 
 
The definition of ‘institutions’ has been subject to increased scrutiny recently, with attempts 
being made to elaborate upon Veblen’s (1969: 239) observation: 
 
“As a matter of course, men order their lives by these principles [of action] and,  
practically, entertain no question of their stability and finality.  That is what is meant 
by calling them institutions; they are the settled habits of thought of the generality of 
men.  But it would be absentmindedness … to admit that … institutions have … 
stability [that is] intrinsic to the nature of things” (emphasis added). 
 
Veblen’s description, as Hodgson (2004) observes, directly associates instinct-habit 
psychology with the structuring of social relations5.  
Veblen established examples of institutions to include money, marriage, markets, 
organisations, religions and language. Language is the fundamental institution predicating all 
other institutions and its recursive and so communicative quality furnishes the key to 
organising (Searle 2005, Robichaud et al., 2004).  Institutions exhibit differences in level, 
scale, scope and durability and therefore possess multiple roles and meanings for individual 
actors (Jessop, 2000; Parto, 2005).  Other definitions refer to institutions as: correlated 
                                                 
4  In Potts’ (2000) terms, we analyse the durability and reproduction of connections. 
 
5  This establishes a direct challenge to the presumption of Cartesian dualism of matter and mind, and the 
Cartesian-Newton dualism of object and subject.  More generally the pragmatist philosophers Dewey and Peirce 
emphatically reject the dictum of the analyst as independent spectator.  Inquiry is action and action is partly 
constitutive of reality recursively, communicatively and so socially (Haack, 2004).  Following Cartesian 
dualism the individual is characterized as socially disengaged, subjective and inward-looking:an atomistic 
conception of the individual recurring in mainstream economics (Davis 2003, 2004). Individuals and 
institutions are disengaged. 
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behavioural patterns (Bush, 1987); rules, conventions and norms (Hodgson, 2004); and 
mental constructs (Neale, 1987).  Following a rule may be understood in terms of an 
injunction or disposition that in certain circumstances an individual is expected by others to 
‘do something’ instead of nothing and as an alternative to some other action (Hodgson 2004: 
14).  Rules and institutions, when perceived as legitimate and acted upon, correlate behaviour 
and possess a generic quality in that they can encapsulate norms and conventions as well 
formal and legal rules.  
Despite rules and norms exhibiting generic similarities there are important 
distinctions. For instance, the sources of rules and norms differ: the former being a form of 
either tacit or explicit agreement initiated by some authority, which establishes individuals’ 
deontic powers; in effect rights, obligations, duties, roles and legitimacy (see Searle, 2005, 
and Avio, 2002, 2004). By contrast, norms are derived from a network of mutual beliefs as 
individuals anticipate actions and communications, which substitutes for specific and 
codified agreements for particular instances of action and communication. Davis (2003) 
maintains that norms are a form of “we-intentions,” instituting reciprocal beliefs – or a 
common worldview (Jessop, 2000) – and acting as a mutually reinforcing and taken-for-
granted structure.  
Rules and norms imply differential enforcement properties. A breach of rules 
suggests the potential for legitimate prescriptive sanctions (other connected rules) to be 
applied.  A breach of norms is rarely subject to as prescriptive a level of sanctions (another 
connected form of norm), and may be subject to less easily codified forms of disapproval by 
an individual’s peers, akin to norms of moral suasion. Hence, there is a considerable 
normative element in the process of rules and norms. For the purposes of the present paper, 
however, we take institutions to include all of the foregoing (Hodgson, 2004), whilst 
recognising that there are different types of institutions, possessing different rigidities, 
boundaries, and scale properties. 
 
 
3.  Institutions and Durability 
 
What makes rules and norms more or less durable over time and how does this affect 
individuals’ plans for instigating actions and communications? Do agents form expectations 
as to the likely durability of an institution, and of how their actions-communications affect 
this likely durability?  Or is durability exclusively and ex post question, of assessing how and 
 6
why an institution achieved or acquired durability for a period of time?  For the moment we 
assume the latter, as the former adds another reflexive level. Durability of institutions has 
temporal, geographical and social dimensions. Certainly institutions must be recognized 
within a community; they cannot be recognized by an individual only, acting habitually. 
Recognizing durability in institutions draws attention to the systemic nature of what Veblen 
calls an ‘institutional furniture’: describing them as possibly connected and assessing the 
consequences of connection and disconnection. In addition, institutional durability is in part 
to be understood, without necessarily moving to a functionalist perspective, as due to the 
(hierarchical) relations they define and the rights and obligations entailed. Searle (2005: 10), 
in a rather functionalist discussion of institutions, argues: 
 
“The essential role of human institutions and the purpose of having institutions is not  
to constrain people as such, but, rather to create new sorts of power relationships.  
Human institutions are, above all, enabling because they create power … marked by  
such terms as: rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments,  
requirements, and certifications. I call of these deontic powers” (original emphasis). 
 
In addition to emphasizing language, Searle points to the political constellation – as ‘new 
forms of power relations’ – that is supported by or expressed through a particular language. 
Earlier, Searle (1995) stressed the complexity of the agent-structure relationship. For Searle, 
individuals’ mental representations of institutions are partly constitutive of institutions and 
reality, since any institution can only exist if people possess and communicate specifically 
related beliefs and attitudes. Thus, conceptually, one’s position on the issue of realism is 
closely related to that of the role of representations, beliefs and attitudes, manifested in action 
as communication through language. 
Searle refers neither to ethics nor values, but it is clear (institutionally) that rules are 
predicated on norms that reflect particular systems of values and beliefs and so are 
legitimising (Avio 2002, 2004). Searle does emphasize that collective or shared intentionality 
is (the basis of all society, and hence institutions. According to Searle, intentionality refers to 
the notion of directedness of the mind, which encapsulates human senses of belief, desire, 
disgust, pride, shame, hope, etc. Collective intentionality refers to collective beliefs and 
collective desires.  
For Davis (2003) and Searle, collective intentionality more specifically denotes social 
relationships between individuals where theories about or images about those social 
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relationships are embedded within individuals (Davis, 2003: 130). Language plays a pivotal 
role in distinguishing individual from collective intentionality, between ‘I-intentions’ and 
‘we-intentions’. We-intentions, in the absence of fraudulent deceit, infer not only the 
individual expressing the ‘we-term’ intent, but also reflect the expresser’s belief that other 
individuals share this intention, and the assumption that other individuals are aware of this 
shared intention. Unlike ‘I-intentions’, ‘we-intentions’ invoke some form of obligation and 
commitment on the part of the individual that does not exist with the expression of an 
independent (individual) intention. This is a powerful challenge to the reductionist 
conception of the atomistic individual that characterises institutions as constraints. 
We expect that institutions can be distinguished, in part because they have different 
qualities of durability.  For instance, some rules can be considered to be more durable than 
individuals’ habits of thought. Individuals often situate and embed themselves within durable 
systems of rules and norms, even though the system might well change owing to it 
comprising connections between different durabilities of the constituent rules and norms 
(Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 1985; Dolfsma et al. 2005).  Following Veblen (1969) there is no 
suggestion of some sort of institutional “equilibrium”.  Durability does not infer “no change” 
and instead begs the question of how durability can occur. Despite change, institutions retain 
some means of re-identification through time. An institutional system is durable and may 
thus be re-identified if and when the core institutions do not change, while adjacent 
institutions may only change marginally. This means that the habits and routines of 
individuals and groups that support the system, or on which the system relies, reproduce it. 
Power may be used to prevent changes, but the use of powers by some may also 
change the system. Power is, of course, a complex, multi-dimensional and evolving 
conception and phenomenon, located in a system of relationships rather than attributable to 
people (Foucault , and, for our purposes especially Avio) that may be partly manifest through 
moral suasion (Hodgson 2003). The establishment or emergence, and subsequent (lack of) 
change of a particular system of rules, norms and conventions, and institutions – all of which 
involve multiple levels of evolution and emergence as well as differential power relations – 
demonstrate historical and temporal specificities.  Indeed, the importance of history in any 
critical analysis of socio-economic phenomena cannot be over-emphasized. 
In reconstituting Veblen’s instinct-psychology, Hodgson (2003, 2004) provides a 
complementary rationale for institutional persistence.  Hodgson (2003: 167) argues that all 
action and deliberation are predicated on prior habits: habit has ontological and temporal 
primacy over intention and reason. Habits may be closely associated with routines, such as 
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functioning as organisational memory (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Lawson (1997: 159-160) 
defines a routine as, “… a regular course or manner of proceeding or going on, a recurrent 
performance of particular acts” (emphasis added).  Others hold that habits do not necessarily 
involve acts, but are propensities, dispositions and “submerged repertoires” to behave, ie to 
act, to communicate, in particular ways in specific situations, or as a consequence of 
particular stimuli (Dewey, 1945; Hodgson, 2003).   
Like routines, habits are both acquired through, and necessary for, learning (Dewey, 
1945). It is through commonly held habits that social systems of rules are manifest. Rules 
beget habits that beget institutional persistence. Durability of institutions is furnished through 
collective intentionality, the temporal and ontological primacy of habit, and the normative 
apparatus associated with this. In effect, habits and routines are the conduits of institutional 
reproduction (Hodgson 2004). Of course, rules, habits and routines, etc. are not purely 
functional: historical specificity and scalar effects impact on the foregoing factors and thus 
on durability. 
The centrality of habit as a partial influence on larger-scale institutional durability is 
supported by the recursive properties of language. Robichaud, et al. (2004) indicate that the 
recursivity of language has played a prominent role in the diverse works of Chomsky and 
Habermas. The importance of recursivity resides in pursuing the stable and durable 
conversational procedures that embeds a text within another text, a meta-text. The process of 
embedding also structures discourse (and practice) in particular ways and leads to the 
persistence of particular organisational forms. 
The notion of situated rationality or cognition and the specificity of rules and norms 
to positions provide an appealing demonstration of the persistence of institutions (and 
structures) vis-à-vis individuals (agents). Rationality may be referred to as an actuality but 
may better be considered a (human or a cognitive) capacity (Lawson 1997). Individual actors 
situate and orientate themselves within systems of institutions within a particular point in 
time and space. Institutions allow individuals, through rules, to act in fashions that enable 
them to negotiate “their daily affairs” (Lawson, 1997: 187).  Yet within this milieu 
individuals are situated in a range of positions, distinguished in or by time and space, that 
each infer roles and status (Searle, 1995, 2005), conditioning and moulding their propensities 
to act in particular ways. Rules may be attached to distinct positions and locations, so affect, 
and are interpreted by distinct individuals differently. Searle (2005: 7) emphasizes the 
capacity of individuals to perform assigned functions requiring collective acceptance to 
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legitimise the position. Lawson emphasizes the properties associated with social positions: 
for rules attached to positions there are differences in deontic powers.  
Whereas rules and norms about positions suggests that rules are not reproduced and 
transformed by the actions of the individuals occupying these positions, but by groups 
influenced by and defining the position(s). Here Lawson draws attention not just to social 
embeddedness, but also to networks (in a fashion redolent of Potts) and groups. Institutions 
demonstrate persistence due to the collective, not the individual.  Thus, as Lawson (1997: 
163) observes: 
 
“Teachers … are allowed and expected to follow different practices from students, …  
employers from employees, men from women …  Rules as resources are not equally  
available, or do not apply equally, to each member of the population at large”. 
 
Part of the durability of institutions resides in the social positions legitimised by social rule 
systems through habits associated to (and acquired by individuals occupying) those roles and 
positions.  There is a reiteration of not only the durability of institutions, but of institutions as 
systems of values reflected in the deontic powers vested in particular social roles, and hence 
individuals’ situated rationality. Searle (2005) observes that language further contributes to 
the persistence of deontology.  As, “not all deontic power is institutional, but just about all 
institutional structures are matters of deontic power” (Searle 2005, p. 10), the interaction 
between specific styles or modes of language and discourse as habits embedded in social 
positions offers lucrative avenues of inquiry into institutional change. 
Until now, our commentary has favoured larger-scale norms and rules ahead of the 
habits and practices associated with individual agents.  It is important to recognise that the 
institutionalist literature appreciates that feedback from individuals, and individual actions 
have the potential to change institutions. For instance, rules and norms necessarily require 
individuals to interpret them.  Individuals possess free will in this respect, and also have 
recourse to different repertoires of habit and experience given a particular situation (Finch, 
1997).  Often differences in interpretation can have consequences for action and hence carry 
potential ramifications for habit and the reproduction of an institution. A classic example of 
this is provided by Fox (1974) when he alludes to the simple instruction: “sweep the floor”. 
There is an element of individual discretion as to what constitutes the appropriate 
performance level in discharging even such an apparently routine task. The outcome may be 
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readily identifiable, but the manner in which task is undertaken may not, and will be partly 
related to the individual’s motivation and deontic powers. 
In this respect it is essential to appreciate that the duration of institutions is not a 
mechanical exercise. Durability of institutions is not akin to identical replication, but to 
reproduction: change, even transformation, is inevitable (O’Hara 2000), due to historico-
spatial and individual contingency properties of a situation (Potts 2000: 44-45). Moreover, 
the persistence of institutions can obviously be affected by other, wider or more indirectly 
related and general institutions and environmental and historical effects and events. For 
instance, Hodgson (2004), O’Hara (2000) and O’Neill (1998), in addition to Polanyi’s classic 
contribution, are among those who have commented extensively on capitalism as a system of 
mutually supporting, if contradictory, institutions. Institutions will clearly have differentials 
in endurance. Another example of durability, yet change, of a system of institutions is that of 
democracy (Dunn 2004). One of the most enduring institutions in the UK is the monarchy, 
but here too there has been extensive change in the deontic powers and influence of the 
individuals placed in the roles defined by this institution. From a position of extensive 
political power, the monarchy in the UK is presently largely ceremonial. The influence of 
such institutions should not be discounted (cf. Veblen 1969), what is equally notable is how 
the British system of government would be described by most as a democracy, despite the 
fact that it is vastly different from Athenian democracy, or even from extant democracies. As 
O’Hara (2000: 39) argues, 
 
“Hence rather than seeing socio-economic reproduction as being purely a process of 
maintenance, function, and equilibrium, it must be historically situated in a maze of 
potential dysfunctions, contradictions, and transformations, without, of course, 
ignoring the historical functions of institutions” 
 
It is the potential for reproduction that Barel (1974) emphasises as the essence of institutional 
durability (cf. O’Hara). He argues: 
 
“… reproduction implies differentiation; growth, change (continuous or 
discontinuous).  However, there is something that does not change, which makes it 
reproduction. This ‘something’ is the capacity of a system to preserve, for a time, its 
entirety in relation to its ‘environment’ and to behave as if its aim were to preserve 
that entirety … what perhaps best describes social reproduction is … that this 
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reproduction is a unity of contraries: unity of social contradictions, unity of change 
and stability, unity of continuity and discontinuity”. 
 
 
4. Re-identifying Institutions Through Change 
 
The emphases of Barel and O’Hara on the essences of reproductive capacity as a means of 
institutional recognition, stability, difference and hence durability through time and change is 
attractive.  Yet there appears to be a potential oversight in their accounts. If institutions are 
durable or persistent, yet subject to change, how can institutions be recognised from one 
point in (real) time to another? Instructive inferences may be drawn from Davis’ (2003) 
analysis of conceptualization of the individual in economics. Davis establishes two tests: 
individuation (can individuals be distinguished), and re-identification (can individuals be re-
identified over time?).  The general gist of the argument, we submit, can be extended to 
cognitive and communicative practices and to institutions, rules and norms.  It is clearly re-
identification that holds most parallels in analysing institutional durability. Davis (2004) 
notes that in mathematics the mapping of transformations is conducted via fixed point 
theorems of the general form such that each point x of a set X to a point f(x) within X has a 
fixed point x* that is transformed to itself:  
 
**)( xxf =        (1) 
 
Davis argues that this is the essence of mainstream and game theoretic discourse in 
economics to demonstrate equilibrium of some sort. Furthermore, there are important lessons 
for economics here as x* is characterised reflexively: “… what would be unchanging about 
individual economic agents amidst change in other characteristics is their being able to take 
themselves as an object” (Davis, 2004: 3). With respect to our analysis of institutions, fixed 
point theorems may have a direct bearing as they involve reflexivity on the part of 
individuals with regard to themselves as well as with regard to the institutions, which they 
perceive in shaping and facilitating senses (Davis and Klaes 2003). 
For rules, conventions and norms to become effective or operative, there must also be 
a collective intentionality (Davis, 2003).  The rules themselves must be collectively viewed 
and so stabilized as legitimate (Avio 2004, Dolfsma 2004). Drawing from pragmatic thought, 
rules are only effective when they are embedded in shared, or at least overlapping and 
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compatible, habits of thought and behaviour (Hodgson, 2004).  Moreover, as Hodgson 
indicates, the appreciation and valuation of rules also, and of necessity, involves a process of 
social interaction, which may be explained in terms of individual actors initiating 
experimental forms of action as communication. To demonstrate Hodgson draws on 
Wittingstein’s signpost analogy: signposts only guide an individual insofar as there is regular 
utilisation of signposts, as a custom, convention or norm of use, and only when others are 
involved who act upon the signposts as well and share an understanding of this. Rules would 
seem to possess habitual and routine propensities.  As Nelson and Winter (1982) argued, 
routines act as conduits of truce and knowledge. Rules also provide bases for what may 
become shared understandings and senses of purpose and meaning (Douglas 1986). 
In reflexive terms, taking oneself as an object involves unequivocally the use of 
language. Language as the fundamental institution furnishes of symbolic representation that 
is essential for institutional recognition and reproduction. For Searle, language provides 
recognition of institutions. However, this isn’t just particular cases within an institution, but, 
“… the particular instances typically exist as such because they are instances of a general 
institutional phenomenon” (Searle, 2005: 14). In addition, in recognition of one’s inevitable 
embeddedness in an institutional and relational sense, taking oneself as an object means 
understanding, however implicitly, institutions in their general form. Searle (2005) has 
suggested as a general form for institutions: 
 
X counts as Y in C      (2) 
 
Here X are certain features of an object, entity, person, or state of affairs; Y assigns a status 
function (to X) carrying a deontology in context C (cf. Lawson, 1997: 162). There is, as 
argued above, inevitably a measure of freedom involved for each individual in determining 
what an institution requires her to do; there is an individual H making an interpretation and a 
judgment about the X, the Y as well as the C. Some properties of the elements may have 
changed (some), while other elements, which by achieving stability over time become 
essential to that overall institution, must have retained their essential identities, at least 
according to H (O’Neill, 1998).  For H to be able to function properly in a community, her 
understanding of X, Y and C must be shared. Individuals’ being is of necessity part of a 
community (Bush 2007, Carrithers 1990), sharing and (thus) reproducing an understanding 
of an institution is bound up with language; it is a fundamental way of understanding the 
concept of an institution. A reformulation of Searle’s general form can be proposed:  
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According to H, understood and communicated in language L 
within a society S,  X counts as Y in C         (3) 
 
For instance, the institution of marriage has been subject to radical change over the past 
century. People’s understanding of the institution has changed dramatically, even when 
‘outer forms’ (or forms outwith?), such as rules have remained similar. Two people 
expressing promises to commit themselves to each other in front of an audience of witnesses 
at the behest of a person of authority, suitably attired given her/his role, still constitutes a 
wedding ceremony in most cultures.  Much has changed in the understanding of people in 
most communities, however, even to those who have been married for quite a prolonged 
period.  In many but not all instances, even the words used to form the promises have 
changed and continue to change.  The religious element has diminished for many; women, in 
general, appear to be less economically dependent; divorce is more readily available, and co-
habitation out with the confines of marriage is more socially acceptable, and hence 
legitimate. In terms of Searle’s logical sequence, X a woman who is married attains the status 
function of a wife, Y, but the context, C, of the sequence has changed such that the deontic 
powers assigned to wives has altered, as a consequence of changing social values and 
economic conditions, which have changed aspects of the status function, Y, at least in legal 
terms. There is still durability to the institution of marriage that ensures that it remains 
recognisable, possesses legitimacy, and retains, at the risk of an obvious double meaning, 
reproductive qualities. 
Yet, the examples of marriage and market indicate the limits of Searle’s definition: 
what of H in (3) above?  Perceptions, as well as ethical values, are not integrated into 
Searle’s view of an institution. Searle’s perception of language, its use and the changes it 
views, is oddly positivistic.  
 
 
5. Language, Discourse and their Boundaries 
 
In previous sections, we have discussed the stability of institutions, comprising complexes of 
rules, norms and habits. Institutions are characterised by the potential for instability, 
especially but not only in the form of localised changes and challenges to order, whether 
purposeful or as unintended consequences. We have argued how understanding durability 
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and change requires the acknowledgement of the roles that language and communication 
play. Through the fundamental institution of language knowledge is communicated without 
which communities could not function. Communities, however ephemeral and short-lived, 
and at whatever minimal basis6, establish homogeneity of meaning and purpose through 
language, broadly understood, ex-communicating risk and disorder. It is our purpose in this 
section to understand language from a social science perspective. 
Searle has made a strong argument that language needs to be understood as the 
fundamental social institution.  While the structure of human society is immensely 
complicated, the realization and conceptualization of language makes it possible to 
understand the rather simple underlying principles, Searle claims. Thus, epistemic and 
ontological statements are more easily distinguished. We believe that Searle points to a 
fundamental contribution that is still to be made to institutional theory, yet we claim that a 
fuller understanding of language than is offered in Searle’s framework is to be sought. We 
seek an understanding that acknowledges that people who communicate help construct 
reality, but also have their own interpretation of it. Such interpretations will differ between 
individuals, often a reason for changes in Veblen’s “institutional furniture”, and this opens up 
the permanent possibility of instability among connecting habits, rules, norms and customs as 
drawn upon by actors.  From Dewey:  
 
“Every new idea, every conception of things differing from that authorized by current  
belief, must have its origin in an individual. New ideas are doubtless always  
sprouting, but a society governed by custom does not encourage their development.   
On the contrary, it tends to suppress them, just because they are deviations from what  
is current.  The man who looks at things differently from others is in such a  
community a suspect character . . .’ (1916, p. 346; italics in the original) 
 
If and when an individual is able to persuade others that current institutions need to 
change, such change will occur. The persuasion will, as Searle would suggest, involve 
language. Persuasion is necessarily communicative.  However, languages are not given, nor 
are the categories in any given language.  People employ and change a language as their 
needs, perceptions and experimental plans of action change. What it means to be a friend, the 
use and meaning of money, what people understanding by science, have all changed over 
                                                 
6 Thus, while there may ostensibly be no talking going on in the institution of ‘silent trade’ (Herskovits 1940), 
or that of the ‘port of trade’ (Polanyi 1966), there is certainly some communication involved and a common 
understanding and purpose.  
 15
time and differ across communities and countries. This needs to be understood, and has 
clearly been on the agenda for institutional theorists. An obvious next step would then be, in 
Searle’s terms, to conceptualize how ‘the procedure or practice of counting X as Y becomes 
regularized’ ‘becomes a rule’ (Searle 2005: 9). 
Searle (2005) alludes to the analogy of a man and a dog both possessing the physical 
capabilities to view another man crossing a line with a ball.  For the dog there is no 
significance, even although it may be possible to train the dog to take the ball across the line. 
For the man the significance of the act lies in the institutional context of the action: in 
American football the action could signify a ‘touchdown’, and the accumulation of points for 
one team as opposed to another.  On this basis it can argued that the emergence of humans’ 
ability to express and comprehend concepts – language provides labels, or symbols, for 
concepts (Nightingale, 2003) – engenders the emergence of institutions.  
Language, of course, furnishes a structure to social relationships, and also employs 
rules as to its appropriate usage. Rules are broader than demonstrating a prescriptive element, 
as they also enable and partly constitute action and communication. Language also enables 
the expression and comprehension of beliefs and values, which is context specific, implies 
the adherence to rules, and its recursive properties form the potential basis for boundaries 
(Robichaud, et al., 2004).  
 Importantly, language use, like institutions in general, demonstrates some socially 
constructed invariance, which provides socially embedded individuals with the means to 
cope with and to promote change (Neale, 1987).  Jessop (2000) considers that institutions 
enable compromises between agents over agents’ differential spatial and time horizons of 
action in relation to their environments, and thus necessarily involve communication. 
Institutions are constructs that principally involve analytical expression in terms of structure 
and order (Potts 2000: 44-5).  Potts’ observations accommodate the historical specificity of 
institutions and intimates evolutionary capacities, which obviously entails that the durability 
of observed institutional arrangements is both non-permanent and a product of history. 
Luhmann (1995) adopts a perspective from social systems rather than networks and 
this draws attention to systems’ capacities for continuation, which he captures as a quality of 
autopoiesis (see also Jessop, 2000).  Luhmann’s social systems, and in particular their 
capacities of continuing, draw attention to the (relatively) closed nature of system 
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boundaries.7  An important question is how social systems can achieve continuation 
temporally when action and communication is often experimental and when environments 
must contain uncertainties and surprises.  Formally and also generally, institutions may 
become systems through continuation via reflexivity, and this implies boundaries and 
environments, which in turn implies that selections are made in accepting and rejecting 
others’ communications, often in the basis of incomplete information.  Systems, which may 
be seen as reflexive, and complexes of rules, norms and customs, are continuing institutions 
that can acquire stability and difference and so can become recognised as distinct.  The 
autopoietic (that is, self reproducing) quality implies that systems are closed in the sense of 
possessing within a boundary sufficient resources to potentially acquire the quality of 
continuation.   
Luhmann argues that action is a one-sided – rather than false – description of 
continuing social systems.  Action as utterance is part of a three-part unity, including 
information and verstehen, to comprise communication.  In an ex ante sense, institutions can 
be explained as sites of communication, which must be essentially experimental on behalf of 
its initiators.  So an institution is simultaneously brought into re-existence and also put at risk 
through communication.  In an ex post sense, institutions are in the memories and also habits 
of actors and seen as successful propos for past episodes of communication.   
Luhmann’s social systems are at a more abstract and also more general level of 
analysis than is common in discourse analysis, which tends to focus on ethnographies in 
particular situations, with spatial and temporal locations or extents. The themes that unite 
these approaches are boundaries, communications and continuations. The abstract theoretical 
qualities of Luhmann’s work allow us to develop our investigation of the durability of 
different institutions.  For Luhmann, “utterances” (which may otherwise be seen in artificial 
isolation as actions) are formulated as information through a combination of the interpretive 
frames and skills of agents.  Nothing is “sent”, nothing is “given-up” and nothing is 
“accumulated”.  Rather, understanding (“Verstehen”) holds out the possibility of challenge, 
adjustment and change.  Utterance need not be verbal to contribute to communication as a 
non-response can be interpreted successfully as a rejection or in a network sense as a missed 
connection.  Likewise, a response can indicate a failed instance of communication and an 
absence of understanding.   
                                                 
7 There are two fundamental issues one might discuss at this point, but that we do not develop. Is an ‘objective’ 
nature of the system or people’s perception implied? A second point is of an ontological nature: does one hold 
that the system analyzed is essentially open or closed? (cf. Grunberg 1978) 
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 Discourse analysts tend to focus on utterance, which may be observable, articulated 
and codifiable, rather than communication, which involves expectations and cognitive 
processes.  Nevertheless, communication is implied as researchers have concentrated upon 
interlocking texts (as actions and utterances) and also on processes by which texts can be 
identified as of deviant form or in compliance with some previously established order.  The 
discourse itself, much like the social system, is not available directly to participants 
(including researchers).  Instead, we are directed towards texts. Texts are authored or 
inscribed so are actions and utterances.  They are inscribed with reference to both an 
understanding of a context, including its spatial and temporal dimensions, and also with 
respect to one or more media, which themselves impose rules, conventions and conditions.   
There is some debate as to what counts as media and what counts as text.  Answering 
this question requires understandings of the context in which a text is authored.  Essentially, 
a text should posses the capacities of retrievability, storability and durability.  Being a text 
implies a quality of transcendence of a particular context of utterance, which the author may 
well be aware of (such as authors of diaries and of corporate financial accounts).  
Codification with respect to a variety of media satisfies the conditions of being a text (Cowan 
and Foray 1997, Cowan et al. 2000).  It is debatable whether oral conversation can be text, 
but we should not exclude this possibility.  Oral histories and retrospective interviews are 
instances of relying upon agents’ memories of spoken texts, often but not necessarily 
supported by texts authored in other media. 
 In Luhmann’s terms, unity of utterance, information and Verstehen in text should 
again be emphasised.  We cannot easily isolate one element of this even though utterance in 
the form of text is available to researchers, who acquire the status of communicators.  For 
instance, we could argue that the media by which utterance is inscribed to be information 
affects what the author meant.  The codification debate is an example (Ancori, et al. 2000, 
Nightingale 2003).  It is clear that personal knowledge or tacit knowledge, or knowledge 
emerging from face-to-face conversation or group working is altered if codified as translation 
for another media.  An author may intend that information is made more widely available, 
and that different media may be chosen to achieve transcendence beyond a context otherwise 
bounded tightly in spatial and temporal dimensions.  But given the emphasis on 
communication or discourse, the idea of authoring – as an instance of initiating action – in 
isolation is irrelevant and nonsensical.   
We can study, or at least frame as problematic, the interactions of utterance, 
information and Verstehen, of the media associated with particular instances.  As Luhmann 
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argues, action (as utterance and authoring) in isolation is at best one-sided.  Brown (1993, 
1994) makes a similar point in assessing historical or canonical texts in economics, and in 
understanding the economy as text.  Recovering authorial intention is also misguided or at 
least one-sided.  Reading an historical text or the economy is neither bounded nor determined 
by authorial intentions.  Indeed, it is debatable whether authorial intentions can themselves 
be recovered by a ‘reading agent’ and communicated, given the unity of utterance, 
information and Verstehen. 
 Robichaud et al. (2004) introduce three ideas that can help in understanding the 
dimension of continuation or durability that discourse analysis should but does not always 
comment upon:  narrative, closure (black box) and meta-discourse.  These have much in 
common with social systems theory, especially with respect to Luhmann’s (1995: 29) 
observation that boundaries are ‘an evolutionary achievement par excellence [in] separating 
yet connecting’’.  Narrative is a particularly strong form of discourse in that its texts refer 
explicitly to one another in a continuing sense, with a continuing intention and potentially 
with the consequence of spanning contexts or situations.  By contributing to a narrative, 
authors set out to transcend or extend contexts as defined spatially and temporally as a means 
of establishing legitimacy and hence also deviance.  New texts can be judged as acceptable or 
unacceptable and established texts can have their status reviewed.  A narrative has a 
projecting quality, so its correspondents can presume continuation such that agents who are 
initiating communications can seek to acquire an audience by positioning a text relative to a 
narrative.  Narratives are institutionalizing, organizing, legitimizing and canonizing.   
 Narrative requires further attention.  Robichaud et al. (2004) argue that narrative is 
prominent when a discourse appears to be threatened.  The emphasis on threat implies that 
threat is episodic or periodic as an event, rather than constant.  An advantage of referring to 
social systems theory is that despite its general and deeply functional nature, it provides a 
different perspective.  This perspective is one of continual uncertainty and periodic threat 
(given preceding sentence), so a continual presence of communication, narrative, organizing 
and canonizing.  A narrative has the consequence and can be a means of closing a discourse 
and so shaping, forming, distinguishing and so necessarily closing a social system.   
Social systems have been theorised as being closed, as open and as autopoietic (or 
self-reproducing).  An advantage of understanding social systems as autopoietic is that they 
have the capacity necessarily of excluding and ignoring events, formulated as a system’s 
environment (Vanderstraeten 2000).  Autopoietic systems are distinct by having boundaries 
and also environments, but are improbable, vulnerable and if realising the capacity of 
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continuation, worthy of further inquiry.  From an institutional perspective, institutions are 
worthy of consideration not because they are stable and durable, but because the qualities of 
stability and durability are constantly threatened in an ex ante sense, and from the perspective 
of action as communication.  This is particularly note-worthy where we consider the 
dimension of (some) institutions as boundaries between and connecting a system and its 
environment. 
 In terms of narratives – now understood as analogous to autopoietic social systems – 
a deeply functional quality is that they must exclude some texts in order to be distinct as 
narratives necessarily with the quality of continuation.  Narratives do not combine all current 
and future texts.  Further, a basis of exclusion is not the continuing discourse implied by 
detailed critical appraisal, but rather is failed communication and so detachment.  A 
discourse, which can acquire the characteristic of narrative or acquire the characteristic of 
continuation with reference to a narrative, has an environment.  This environment is with 
respect to a particular narrative.  The environment is not another social system as, from the 
perspective of its social system (such as a narrative), it is boundless.  There are no privileged 
overseeing positions, whereby some text may be characterised as belonging to one social 
system, or if failing to establish communications with the narrative, be relocated to another 
social system.  In terms of a health services example, we can potentially understand texts 
from the perspective of, say, a national health narrative.  Other texts are in the environment 
of the national health narrative.  In a different context, we can potentially understand texts 
from a private health narrative.  Other texts are placed in its environment.  Little knowledge 
can be gleamed from the claim that because a text is in the environment of one narrative this 
implies that it is within the social system of another narrative because knowledge is for a 
social system and a narrative. 
 The problem of what is fundamentally and in a deeply functional sense 
incommensurability (or the continuation of difference) is not recognised explicitly in 
Robichaud et al.’s (2004) discussion of discourse.  Nevertheless, Robichaud et al. develop 
their argument in a way which suggests a resolution to the disconnection of a system and its 
environment.  Drawing on the second and third significant elements of their argument – 
closure (black box) and meta-text – narratives can be simplified.  The argument is 
reminiscent of Simon’s (1962) systems analysis and also of more recent contributions to 
modularity in organisation and production (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Brusoni and 
Prencipe 2001, Langlois 2002).  Black-box and meta-text presume that another discourse is 
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continuing and that those contributing to it bring utterances as texts which refer back to 
another discourse.   
There is an explicit presumption of transcendence in closure and meta-text.  
Legitimacy is gained through an agent speaking or joining another episode of 
communication, on behalf of another distinct discourse.  In so doing, the agent claims or 
implies in the contemporary episode of communication that the other discourse is settled.  In 
joining a contemporary discourse, the agent is necessarily involved in closing the other 
discourse.  If the other discourse is not settled, the text upon which the claim of settlement is 
based can be disregarded.  There is an important temporal (and spatial) element (hence, the 
labelling of the joined discourses as ‘other’ and ‘contemporary’).  In a straightforward sense, 
closure in one discourse is a precondition for its black-boxing, and for an agent to claim 
legitimacy in another (contemporary) discourse by referring back to the other original 
discourse in a text.   
In a more complex sense, an agent may be attempting to close-down the other 
discourse by authoring a text in a contemporary discourse which refers to this earlier and still 
perhaps unsettled discourse.  Again, we demonstrate the underlying risk to institutions’ 
continuation that is an essence of action as communication.  Simon’s (1962) systems analysis 
is explicitly hierarchical, which can now be questioned given more recent descriptions as 
heterarchical (Jessop 2001).  Simon highlights another type of fragility, which in referring to 
blackboxing and meta-texts is that ‘the architecture of complexity’ is nearly-decomposable.  
This is one possible process by which two different discourses, perhaps recognised as 
narratives or canons, can be brought into a single discourse or process of communication.   
Other processes can be envisaged with respect to the continuing character of 
discourses and narratives.  Canonization may fail.  Brown (1993) writes of deliberative 
‘decanonizing discourses’.  While discourse continues, the canonization is avoided, or 
perhaps is displaced to ideological or ethical conventions.  For instance, if an organizing 
principle – itself a subject of texts – is along the lines of valuing pluralism or of multi-
vocality, this becomes difficult to blackbox in the sense of Robichaud et al. (2004).  We 
should also try to envisage processes by which always-vulnerable narratives as social 
systems break down into dysfunction.  Luhmann (1995) predicts the breakdown of social 
systems where messages permeate a system’s boundaries but are necessarily unintelligible.  
The utility of social systems for agents – who are necessarily contemplating, undertaking and 
reviewing action as communication – with respect to their environments is in categories, 
typifications and procedures.  Social systems are complex, but by implication less complex 
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than their environments.  There is no one-for-one correspondence of entities classified as 
events in environments and matching responses generated within systems.  If a system or a 
narrative is abandoned, so too is its environment because distinction and definition 
represented by its boundary are lost. 
The discussion to this point has been of discourse, of texts and of narratives.  
Narratives can be compared with institutions and also with social systems.  Our main interest 
is in the necessity of narratives to exclude as well as include texts to establish definition and 
continuation in shaping continuing communication, which in turn implies boundaries.  In 
order to be applied, our discussion can be developed along two trajectories.   The first 
trajectory is more general than discourses, to do with identifying different narratives and their 
relationships.  The second is more specific, in applying the principle of discourses to texts 
about a particular institution or system of interest authored by its participants.   
In our first general trajectory the guiding hypothesis is of discourses that take the form of 
incommensurable narratives, which themselves represent social systems.  We can identify 
social systems with narratives as narratives provide a basis for accepting or rejecting texts, 
for instance by accumulating precedents and typifications.  Discourses in which texts are not 
arranged around narratives do not imply systems unless there is some other potentially 
unifying commitment to something like pluralism or multi-vocality per se.   
Calculation is a general example of narrative, which can be applied to health care 
even though it has been developed more fully in contexts of encounters around markets 
(Callon and Muniesa 2005).  Calculation is a type of discourse in that it involves 
communication about and applications of techniques of calculation and about entities that can 
be represented as data in calculation.  Calculation is a narrative (or strong) form of discourse 
because prior to its undertaking in specific locations, agents can form common general 
expectations as to the kinds of processes and outcomes involved (Porter 1992).  Callon and 
Muniesa (2005) argue that entities can be compared as goods if they acquire the properties of 
stability, delimitation and definition.  Stability allows auditable comparison over time and 
space and so establishes continuation.  Delimitation and definition allow for qualities to be 
compared.  But calculation implies the acceptance or rejection of means of calculation and 
means of categorisation or codification and entities to be considered as goods (information).     
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion: Understanding Institutions and Institutional Change 
Through Language and Boundaries 
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Institutional and social economists are well aware of the need to conceptualize the human 
being in a way that allows for motives other than self interest and that allows for an influence 
of the environment on how preferences are formed and how decisions are made (Davis 
2003). If there is no conceptual way to relate the individual to social settings except for the 
influence of budget constraint and the availability of resources, to pursue a selfish aim, what 
possibilities are there to discuss communities—networks—as well as their institutional 
context? 
Individuals enter into relations and market transactions. These are of necessity 
subjected to boundaries, as institutional and social economists know. Sure enough, general 
features, or essences, of market may be recognized (Rosenbaum 2000). The exchange of 
property rights to commodities that typify markets as an institution is one prominent 
example. Yet, many of the general rules one might come up with turn out to be applicable in 
a small number of areas. Prices may for instance be fixed in some markets while in others 
bargaining is the norm. Markets may involve the exchange of money for goods, or there may 
be barter; a combination is possible. Sometimes what is applicable is indeterminate even 
within a given society. For instance, the representations of ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ do not 
necessarily ensure ready identification. Some elements that many would describe as essential 
need not be essential in the perception of others. What may legally and morally be exchanged 
through the mechanism of a market changes fundamentally across fields, societies and time. 
The question of whether children, life insurance, religious mercy could be exchanged over a 
market have been answered differently in different times in the past. Our present perception 
in these issues is largely immaterial; what is important is that during these different times, the 
perception then was shared, shared through language. From the perspective of action and 
communication, and through language broadly, the boundaries of what was required 
behaviour in a given situation was diffused throughout a community. Through the use of 
language, such boundaries change. What is needed, in addition to what Searle has suggested 
in his conceptualization of institutions, is an understanding that does full justice to the role of 
language and thus of perception. 
An economy without a rule of law of a formal or an informal kind is impossible. 
When the state is not (yet) able to formally play a role as lawmaker or enforcer, other 
institutes assume such a (legitimate) role, as the Catholic Church did in medieval Europe 
(Ekelund et al., 1996). Law as an institution establishes and conveys formal rules  in 
language, and, draws boundaries between what is permitted and what is not; boundaries in 
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the realms of actions, groups, and goods. At the same time, the law relies on boundaries for it 
to be effective. Without, to some extent, impregnable geographical boundaries, the law is 
toothless. Enforcement of the law partly boils down to the persistence of boundaries. 
Keeping boundaries in place is impossible if there are no boundaries to the extent to which 
individuals are selfish—the law needs (some) people to be moral (sometimes).8 
Boundaries clearly have moral overtones. This holds at a macro level for the 
boundaries between states, at least since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, but is equally true 
for the micro level. Falk (1994) argued, for instance, that individuals police the borders of 
their own body, taking in what they perceive as clean and pure, keeping out what is dirty or 
immoral. People’s sense of the self is related to what they see as their and their communities’ 
boundaries. 
For social entities a similar thing holds. What is included and what is excluded 
defines communities as well as organizations and firms. “They” do not belong to “us” (Elias 
and Scotson 1965; Barth 1970). By establishing a border, a relatively stable sphere is created 
which is safe and predictable in relation to an outside that is not, thus trying to deal with 
uncertainty or risk (Dannreuther and Lekhi 2000). Culturally embedded beliefs and 
knowledge of relatively homogenous groupings develop into rules and values that determine 
which issues are relevant and how to decide on them. The inside/outside distinction that 
boundaries create “lies at the collective” (Falk 1994, 21). Boundaries will thus not only 
function as thresholds, controlling inflow and outflow, but also as binding structures, 
producing and reproducing internal unity (Llewellyn 1994, 14). Boundaries are not simply 
inconsequential residuals, to be changed at will, as is commonly assumed in economics. Yet, 
despite this romantic view, delineating the borders of a market has proven almost 
insurmountable (Horowitz 1981). Much has been written about where the boundaries of the 
firm, for instance, are, but little about what actually occurs at the boundaries (Casson and 
Wadeson 1998). This has not provoked economists to consider the idea of boundaries more 
profoundly. 
Boundaries, more to the point, for members of a community, are available in routines 
that they need to learn, to be socialized into. Boundaries are to be achieved, not assumed. 
According to The Economist: “[B]oundaries of the mind and habit are harder to take down 
                                                 
8 There has of course been a long discussion about the extent to which the law can depart from the general 
feeling in society about what ought to be permissible and what ought not. Even a “society” consisting of wholly 
selfish individuals, however, as Hobbes claimed, would set boundaries on the activities that they themselves 
would be allowed to undertake even when these activities would be beneficial to them. These boundaries will, 
of course, need to be developed, understood and communicated 
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[than boundaries between states].” Personal identities are not perfectly malleable, firms do 
not downsize at will, and communities cannot change overnight, by design. The Economist, 
again, suggested that “borders, like rivers, tend to stick in their places, doing damage when 
they wander.” The recognition that society is an open system (Grunberg 1978) makes clear 
that interactions between a system—individual, organization—and its environment is 
inevitable. Hence the need for (and possibility of) active boundary maintenance, controlling 
which information is exchanged with the environment. Depending on the perceived needs of 
a firm to actively be taking information from outside, and depending on whether it perceives 
its environment as analyzable, it will be more open to an environment and will be 
interpreting that information differently (Leifer and Delbecq 1978; Daft and Weick 1984).  
Accountants are one example of individuals involved in an active and changing 
discourse at the boundaries of a firm, communicating with insiders as well as outsiders 
(Llewellyn 1994). The “iron cage” that a rationalist perspective of society ushers in does not 
allow one to notice such features of organizations and individuals as interpretation and the 
role of boundaries (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Weber 1968). The boundaries created to 
impose homogeneity and certainty create a common institutional “furniture” (Veblen, 1919) 
that allows for interpretation and coordination without direct involvement of a specific 
individual in a specific role. 
 
“[W]hile agency is central to . . . boundary activity, such agency is not only  
accomplished through the reasoned intentions and capabilities of purposeful 
individuals”. (Llewellyn 1994: 10) 
 
Much of the information exchanged is “institutionally generated” (cf. Anand & Peterson 
2000). It is, of course, on individuals that the system of institutions imposes those 
conventional standards, ideals, and canons of conduct that make up the community’s scheme 
of life. As boundaries are achieved by people, a change in their role “always brings potential 
changes in the power structures and systems of meaning within the organization” (Llewellyn 
1994, 17).  
 Recall Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, which he claimed were ‘self-
organizing’ spheres governed by rules or institutions, to be learned while using them, 
interacting with others. His Philosophische Untersuchungen contains the following 
aphorisms that might serve: 
.  
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 5. Learning is a tuning of interpretation between 2 persons 
76. One picture of the same game might have sharp borders, the other none at all 
77. ' Sharp' might be dined as 'blurred', and vice versa. As well 'good' as 'bad'  
78. You can know something in limitless ways.  
83. Games might change while being played. Languages are 'living' systems. 
96. Thought is a language game. A picture of the world. 
 
Searle has made an important contribution to the conceptualization of institutions by 
claiming that language is the fundamental institution without which there would be no other 
institutions and without which no understanding of institutions would be possible. The view 
of language presented by Searle does not emphasize the ambiguity in the use of language, it 
appears not to assume that meanings might differ between people, it seems to exclude 
interpretation and perception. As a result the durability as well as the change of institutions 
may be ill-understood. In attempting to offer a ‘test’ for the re-identification of institutions, in 
order to understand institutional change, we extend the work of Searle by providing a fuller 
notion of language and language use. For one, language creates similar groupings with a 
common sense of identity, separating an inside from an outside by constructing boundaries 
that may need to be actively maintained.  
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